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Gay and lesbian collaborative co-
parenting in New Zealand and the UK: 
“The law doesn’t protect the third parent” 
Dr Philip Bremner 
Dr Nicola Surtees 
 
Abstract  
In many jurisdictions, legislation reflects, retains and reiterates heteronormative two-parent 
models of family. Lesbian and gay individuals and an increasing number of heterosexual 
individuals who choose to parent outside the paradigm of the conjugal couple relationship 
find neither their interests, nor the welfare of their children, are sufficiently protected in 
law. This article is based on the findings of two empirical research projects investigating 
the procreative autonomy of lesbians and gay men in New Zealand and the UK. It focuses 
on collaborative co-parenting families formed by lesbian couples and gay men, with 
reference to the allocation of legal parenthood in these kinds of families and case law across 
both jurisdictions. Two such families are introduced. Attention is drawn to the ways the 
law hampers these families’ preferred parenting arrangements. The article highlights the 
need for legislative change. It concludes that a more flexible, inclusive concept of legal 
parenthood that honours the intentions of those involved in these arrangements in a way 
that is consistent with the interests of the child would potentially benefit all people 
interested in non-traditional parenting.  
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Introduction 
The increasing number of planned families formed through the use of 
assisted reproduction technologies requires an expanded concept of family 
to reflect the reality of the myriad forms that exist, and to ensure that 
children’s interests are adequately protected…Assisted reproduction is used 
by heterosexual couples experiencing infertility, including those who are 
concerned about genetic issues or are unable to carry a fetus to term, and by 
lesbian couples, gay male couples, persons intending to become single 
parents and persons intending to form families with more than two parents. 
They may use anonymous or known donor sperm, ova or embryos, or some 
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combination of donor genetic material and surrogacy. The families that 
result are varied and diverse, and each has a unique and distinct network of 
social and extended family relationships (Manitoba Law Reform 
Commission, 2014: 2-4). 
In New Zealand and the UK, gay and lesbian collaborative co-parenting arrangements are 
part of the variety and diversity referred to in the quote above. Bremner (2017) defines 
collaborative co-parenting as ‘reproductive collaborations’ between gay men and lesbians 
that are characterised by the intention of each of the adults (often more than two) to play 
some sort of parental role in the child’s life. The New Zealand Law Commission’s (2005) 
report, New Issues in Legal Parenthood, recommended amending existing law to allow for 
the recognition of three legal parents where a lesbian couple and the biological father 
conceive and raise a child together. This recommendation, while not acted on in New 
Zealand, was referenced in the lead up to the 2013 British Columbia Family Law Act, 
which legislated for the possibility of three legal parents. Meanwhile in the UK, although 
this issue has not been addressed legislatively, there have been various judicial attempts to 
afford some recognition to gay and lesbian families where there are multiple parents (See 
Smith 2013 for a useful summary of cases in England and Wales). However, the courts do 
not have the discretion to recognize multiple legal parents. Therefore, judges adopt a less-
than-satisfactory approach of using parental responsibility (discussed below; See also 
Harris and George 2010)) which falls short of being recognized as a legal parent.   
This article is based on two empirical research projects focused on gay and lesbian 
families that were conducted separately by one author in New Zealand and the other author 
in the UK. We draw on these projects, which are described later in the article, to argue for 
a more inclusive approach to the recognition of legal parenthood in these jurisdictions. 
Rather than attempting to channel families into a particular model of parenthood, we 
advocate for a legal framework that adequately recognises and values family diversity. By 
discussing the stories of two collaborative co-parenting families (one in the UK and one in 
New Zealand) we highlight how family laws in both jurisdictions fail adequately to 
accommodate the needs of collaborative co-parenting families. Building on this, we 
suggest that in order for the law to properly protect the welfare and rights of children in 
these families, it needs to engage with the interests and intentions of the adults involved.    
Allocating legal parenthood: Heteronormative assumptions about 
parenting 
The way in which the law in New Zealand and the UK1 allocates legal parenthood in 
collaborative co-parenting families bears the hallmarks of heteronormative assumptions 
about parenting and is wedded to the notion of dyadic gendered parenting (for more on this 
see Boyd, 2007; Brown, 2019; McCandless and Sheldon, 2010). The starting point in both 
New Zealand and the UK, as with many other jurisdictions, is that the woman who gives 
birth to a child is that child’s legal parent. The birth mother may be the sole legal parent of 
the child in cases of assisted reproduction using donor sperm. The child may have one other 
 
1 Although the legal analysis in this article primarily focuses on England & Wales, the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 2008 extends to Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
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legal parent, who is either male or female, but no more than two legal parents. We refer to 
this approach to legal parenthood as the ‘two-parent model’. The two-parent model is 
rooted in a traditional conception of the family and, therefore, does not reflect the lived 
experiences of a number of collaborative co-parenting families. This is illustrated by the 
legal position in both New Zealand and the UK which this section of the article considers.  
 
Regulating legal parenthood: Birth mothers and second legal parents 
The Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 [HARTA 2004] governs the 
provision of assisted reproduction treatment in New Zealand. The Act establishes a system 
of prior authorisation of assisted reproduction treatment by the Ethics Committee on 
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ECART), which involves taking the health and 
wellbeing of any children born as a result of the treatment into account (s 4(a)). However, 
HARTA 2004 does not regulate legal parenthood following the use of assisted reproductive 
technologies. In New Zealand the legal parenthood of children is governed by the Status 
of Children Act 1969 [1969 Act]. The 1969 Act was amended by the Status of Children 
Amendment Act 2004 to cover conception through these technologies. As mentioned 
above, the law in New Zealand adopts the same starting point as that in the UK, namely 
that the woman who gives birth to the child is the child’s legal parent (s 17). New Zealand 
law again proceeds on a similar basis to the UK in that it determines the status of the father 
or second female parent based on his or her relationship with the mother. However, in the 
UK, the law will only automatically consider the father or second female parent a legal 
parent where they are married to or in a civil partnership with the birth mother. New 
Zealand law by contrast includes de facto partners (s 14). In both jurisdictions donors are 
not considered legal parents (1969 Act ss 19 – 22 as amended by the Status of Children 
Amendment Act 2004, Part 2; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s 41). 
In the UK, both the use of assisted reproductive technologies and the consequences 
of this for legal parenthood are regulated by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
2008 [HFEA 2008]. There is an inherent distinction in the HFEA 2008 to be drawn between 
single women and female couples, on the one hand, and single men and male couples, on 
the other. In some circumstances, it is possible for a single woman or a female couple to 
be a child’s sole legal parent(s) from birth. However, as in New Zealand, although it may 
be possible for a single man to be one of the child’s legal parents at birth, both partners in 
a male couple will never be considered to be the child’s legal parents from birth. This 
distinction in terms of legal parenthood for men and women derives from the common law 
principle that parturition identifies a child’s mother (Ampthill Peerage Case [1977] AC 
547, 577) and is contained in the HFEA 2008 (s 33(1)). Therefore, upon birth, one of the 
child’s, and perhaps his or her only, legal parent(s) will be his or her birth mother (see 
Lefaucheur, 2004: for a comparison with the position in France, where there is the 
possibility of having motherless children because women have the right to conceive 
anonymously).  
HFEA 2008 makes it clear that, as in New Zealand, a child can only have one other 
legal parent in addition to the birth mother (ss 36 and 42). However, who this second parent 
will be depends on the circumstances of conception. If the child is conceived through 
sexual intercourse then the common law presumption of pater est quem nuptiae 
demonstrant will operate, which is rebuttable by DNA evidence (Family Law Reform Act 
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1969 s 26). The effect of this is that, on birth, the legal father of a child born through sexual 
intercourse will be the biological father or, if no DNA tests have been conducted, the 
mother’s husband if she has one. Although conception through sexual intercourse could 
conceivably feature in collaborative co-parenting arrangements for a variety of reasons, the 
evidence from the case law and empirical studies is that some form of assisted reproduction 
is more common (see also Kelly, 2007). Even if conception occurs through assisted 
reproduction, the law distinguishes between situations where single women and female 
couples not in a civil partnership/marriage conceive at home, on the one hand, as compared 
to single women and female couples who conceive at a licensed fertility clinic or female 
couples in a civil partnership/marriage who conceive at home, on the other. In the former 
situation, the common law rules apply, whereas female civil partners/married couples are 
both treated as the child’s parents from birth, regardless of whether assisted conception 
occurs at a clinic or elsewhere, provided no absence of consent can be shown (HFEA 2008 
s 42). In addition to this, where the appropriate consent forms have been signed, female 
couples who are not in a civil partnership/marriage can be the legal parents on birth 
provided they are treated at a licensed fertility clinic (HFEA 2008 ss 43 and 44) (for an 
example of where the appropriate consent forms had not been signed see AB v CD [2013] 
EWHC 1418 (Fam)). In each of these cases, the biological father would not be considered 
one of the child’s legal parents (HFEA 2008 s 45(1)). New Zealand law, by contrast, does 
not require unmarried female couples to conceive in a clinic in order to benefit from 
automatic legal parenthood but rather applies to all assisted reproduction procedures 
“regardless of where, or how (for example, with whose help) the procedure is carried out” 
(1969 Act, s 15(1) as amended by the Status of Children Amendment Act 2004, Part 2). 
The position in relation to male parents who conceive through assisted reproduction 
is different. In both New Zealand and the UK, because the birth mother is always initially 
one of the child’s two legal parents, a male couple cannot be considered the child’s legal 
parents from birth. However, section 54 of the HFEA 2008 allows a male couple, who are 
either civil partners or living in an “enduring family relationship” and one of whom is the 
child’s biological father, to apply for a parental order, between six weeks and six months 
after birth, making them and not the gestational mother (provided she consents) the legal 
parents. This option was not previously available to single men (or women) (see Re Z (A 
Child) (2) [2016] EWHC 1191 (Fam)). However, the Government has now introduced a 
remedial order to address this disparity which came into force in January 2019 (Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (Remedial) Order 2018). In New Zealand, there is 
no mechanism equivalent to the parental order for gay couples. What is more, in both 
jurisdictions the restriction to two parents limits the possibilities open for the legal 
recognition of collaborative co-parenting arrangements involving more than two parents. 
The intention behind these legislative provisions is to put same-sex parenting on a 
similar footing to different-sex parenting. As Mr Justice Baker observed in the UK context 
“[there] is an acknowledgement that alternative family forms without fathers are sufficient 
to meet a child's need.” (Re G ( A Minor ); Re Z ( A Minor ) [2013] EWHC 134: [113]). 
This is a welcome development and there is concern that this progress could be easily 
jeopardized (Harding 2014). As Boyd (2007: 92) comments “[t]he problem is that the legal 
system still seems tempted to impose a father figure on families that are headed, and 
sometimes carefully designed, by women.” Although Smith (2013: 378) acknowledges this 
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point, she also stresses that “[e]xcluding known donors from legal recognition through a 
system which recognizes only two parents validates and protects lesbian families but also 
reinforces the dyadic parenting norm based on heterosexual reproduction”. This approach 
may benefit parents who wish to form a (homo)nuclear family but excludes others who 
seek to engage in collaborative co-parenting. As Leckey (2015: 1) highlights, “redrawing 
the lines of legal ‘family’ might also further marginalize non-normative caring and kinship 
networks.” Brown (2019: 123) summarises the problem as being that “the scope of legal 
parenthood [has been widened] to allow for the possibility of two female parents, [which] 
has been done without altering or challenging the model on which the provisions are based, 
namely the two-parent model, based upon the traditional, heterosexual, nuclear family.” It 
is this very model that the current article seeks to challenge.   
Acquiring parental responsibility or guardianship 
The legislative provisions relating to legal parenthood described above need to be 
considered in light of the separate legal concept of parental responsibility in the UK (in 
particular in England and Wales) and guardianship in New Zealand; currently, both may 
be of more utility in terms of collaborative co-parenting. In England and Wales, parental 
responsibility is defined in section 3 of the Children Act 1989 as “all the rights, duties, 
powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to 
the child and his property.” In New Zealand, guardianship, which is governed by the Care 
of Children Act 2004, similarly emphasises rights, duties, powers and responsibilities. As 
well as automatically becoming a legal parent in both jurisdictions, a birth mother also 
acquires parental responsibility for her child upon birth in England and Wales, or 
guardianship in New Zealand.  
Thinking particularly about collaborative co-parenting situations involving a 
female couple in the UK, the mother’s female partner would acquire parental responsibility 
on birth if the mother’s partner was the child’s legal parent under HFEA 2008 and was 
either in a civil partnership with the mother at any time between conception and birth 
(Family Law Reform Act 1987 s 1(3)(bb)), was registered as the child’s second parent on 
the birth certificate or had entered into a parental responsibility agreement with the mother 
(Children Act 1989 s 4ZA). Similarly, in New Zealand, the female partner would acquire 
guardianship under the care of Children Act 2004 as the second legal parent, whereas the 
biological father/known donor would need to apply to the Family Court for additional 
guardianship. 
Unlike legal parenthood, in the UK, it is possible for the court to make a child 
arrangements order in favour of more than two adults, including people who are not the 
child’s legal parents. Various adults are entitled to apply for a child arrangements order as 
a matter of right. These include the child’s parent, guardian or step-parent with parental 
responsibility (Children Act 1989 s 10(4)); a spouse or civil partner where the child is 
treated as a child of the family; and someone with whom the child has lived for at least 
three years (Children Act 1989 s 10(5)). Other people such as a mother’s female partner 
where conception occurred at home and who is not in a civil partnership with the mother 
must apply to the court for leave to apply for a child arrangements order, which can confer 
parental responsibility but not legal parenthood. The biological father may also be in this 
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position if he is not considered to be a legal parent (for an example of this see Re G ( A 
Minor ); Re Z ( A Minor ) [2013] EWHC 134). 
Similarly, in New Zealand, other people can apply for additional guardianship, 
including, as already mentioned, a biological father/known donor. A second way known 
donors can mitigate the insecurity of their position is through developing a formal written 
agreement with the legal parents of a child about involvement prior to seeking a court order 
that reflects some or all of the conditions of the agreement under the Care of Children Act 
2004.  
Research overview and approaches 
As indicated earlier, this article draws together findings from two separate research projects 
conducted by the authors. The first study, conducted by Bremner, investigated the ways in 
which the legal frameworks in the UK and Canada accommodate the procreative autonomy 
of lesbians and gay men engaging in or considering collaborative co-parenting. In order to 
compare the relevant laws across these jurisdictions, the study combined a doctrinal 
approach with a contextually sensitive socio-legal approach that could account for the 
social contexts within which the legal rules operate (Cotterrell, 2002; Thomas, 1997). The 
intention in doing this was to avoid the tendency of a purely doctrinal approach to view 
law as a self-contained system governed by distinctively legal concerns (Moran, 2012). To 
generate insight into the personal impact of legal rules on (in this case) family life, the 
study also included an empirical component.  
The second study, which Surtees undertook, similarly investigated the procreative 
autonomy of lesbians and gay men, but from the New Zealand perspective. While 
collaborative co-parenting was of interest, the overarching aim of the study was to explore 
the negotiation of the kin status and place of known gay and heterosexual sperm donors, 
and that of their partners, in the family lives of the children they expected to or had helped 
to conceive. Because Surtees sought to elicit stories about such negotiation, she adopted a 
narrative inquiry methodology underpinned by anthropological and sociological theorising 
about kinship and relatedness. Unlike Bremner’s study, the personal impact of legal rules 
was not a specific focus of inquiry, however these laws contextualised the study and had a 
bearing on the kinds of stories shared.  
Qualitative research methodologies informed both studies. This form of inquiry 
enables the researcher to generate extensive, richly descriptive, context-specific data for 
in-depth interpretive study of particular phenomena and the meanings people attach to 
these (Gray, 2018; Taylor et al., 2016). As such, this approach was well suited to capturing 
and understanding the close-up reality of lesbian and gay men’s collaborative co-parenting 
and the impact legal regulation has on this, the specific focus of this article. 
Notwithstanding the studies’ shared approach, there were a number of methodological 
differences between them, as detailed below. 
The remainder of this section addresses the identification and selection of 
participants for the empirical aspects of the two studies and their methods of data collection 
and data analysis. Ethics approval and ethical considerations are also addressed.  
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Identifying and selecting participants 
Lesbians and gay men constitute a hard-to-reach population because they belong to a 
socially stigmatised group. Developing a sample for this population is challenging, because 
there is no existing sampling frame to recruit from and much remains unknown about the 
population, including size and demographics (Matthews and Cramer, 2008; Weeks et al., 
2001). Because random sampling was not an option, both studies were promoted through 
country-specific lesbian and gay media, lesbian and gay-targeted organisations, social 
groups and online mailing lists. Those wanting to know more about either study were 
typically part of interconnected networks; these were capitalised on through snowball 
sampling. Used to identify and select people who are part of such networks, snowball 
sampling is a particularly useful strategy for accessing hard-to-reach populations, as once 
the researcher has identified potential participants they can act as informants to recommend 
others (Fraenkel et al., 2015; Patton, 2015). 
These recruitment strategies were largely successful. Six prospective and current 
collaborative co-parents across four families in the UK and another six such co-parents 
across three families in Canada participated in Bremner’s study. Participants were 
purposively selected to ensure a diverse range of collaborative co-parenting arrangements. 
In addition, the UK sample included five legal professionals and one health professional 
and the Canadian sample six legal professionals. These professionals, who had worked 
extensively with collaborative co-parenting families, were included on the basis that they 
allowed access to the experiences of a wider range of this particular family form. 
Sixty adults participated in Surtees’ study across 21 lesbian known donor familial 
configurations at different stages of forming family.2 Initial recruitment focused on 
lesbians and gay men who had previously collaborated together in order to conceive 
children through known donor insemination or who were planning to conceive using this 
method. As recruitment proceeded, the inclusion criteria broadened to include a focus on 
heterosexual known donors, because it had become increasingly apparent that such donors’ 
concerns lay with their place, and the place of their partners, in children’s family lives, 
rather than their sexual identities per se. What mattered was the participants’ potential to 
provide insight into a wide range of social identity possibilities and roles for gay or 
heterosexual men as known donors for lesbians, and those of their partners, vis-à-vis the 
family lives of children, given they have no obvious place within kinship systems.  
Collecting data 
As Taylor et al. (2016: 102) observe, “qualitative interviewing is flexible and dynamic.” 
Interview encounters, they continue, are directed towards uncovering participants’ 
experiences. To gain insight into the experience of collaborative co-parenting and the 
impact legal regulation has on this, Bremner conducted a total of 25 individual face-to-face 
or telephone interviews with family members and professionals (12 in the UK and 13 in 
 
2 These adults had formed a variety of social groups patterned on different combinations of relationships, 
including intimate couple relationships and reproductive relationships. The term ‘lesbian known donor 
familial configurations’ captures the diverse interdependencies of the members of any one familial 
configuration, however participants understood these.  
 
 8 
Canada). The interviews were semi-structured, allowing for in-depth guided conversations 
(Cole and Knowles, 2001). Each interview was digitally recorded and transcribed shortly 
after they were held.  
Surtees, on the other hand, chose to gather data by interviewing members of familial 
configurations in groupings of their choice. She conducted 26 face-to-face semi-structured 
interviews in total (10 group interviews, 11 couple interviews and 5 individual interviews). 
Her preferred approach to interviewing was the narrative interview, a particularly useful 
method for collecting stories about participant experiences that can accommodate holistic, 
chronological and long accounts (Bold, 2012; Elliott, 2005; Riessman, 2008). Like 
Bremner, Surtees also digitally recorded and transcribed her interviews. 
In both studies, the rich, detailed data generated through interviewing reflected the 
accepted understanding in qualitative research that the well-managed interview can be a 
powerful tool (Gray, 2018).  
Analysing data 
Frequently considered messy, qualitative analysis merges intuition, insight and intimate 
knowledge of the data (Taylor et al., 2016). Both Bremner and Surtees conducted a 
thematic analysis of their respective data sets generating codes drawn from their interview 
transcripts using Nvivo (QSR NUD*IST Vivo [nVivo], 2008), a qualitative data analysis 
software package. Relationships between the codes were subsequently established before 
being collated into broader themes.  
Despite the methodological differences between the studies, the methodologically 
compatible data Bremner and Surtees obtained, and the similar codes and themes they 
identified, allowed for a coherent analysis and conclusion to emerge. Bringing the two 
studies together in this article allowed the authors to make comparisons between the lived 
experiences of collaborative co-parenting families across New Zealand and the UK, while 
simultaneously highlighting the points of similarity and difference in the allocation and 
regulation of legal parenthood and the mechanisms for acquiring parental responsibility 
and guardianship in their respective jurisdictions.  
Ethical considerations 
Both studies were granted ethics approval from the relevant university ethics committees 
prior to the collection of data.3 During the recruitment phase of the studies, participants 
received information sheets and were asked to sign consent forms. The information sheets 
reflected accepted ethical principles necessary for the protection of all parties in research 
involving humans. For example, the purpose, aims and nature of the research were outlined 
allowing participants to make informed decisions about whether to consent to participate 
or not. Participation was voluntary; this was also specified, as was the right of withdrawal. 
 
3 The University of Exeter College of Social Science and International Studies Ethics Committee approved 
Bremner’s study (11.07.11-xxii). Additionally, approval was gained from the University of British Columbia 
Behavioural Research Ethics Board for the Canadian fieldwork (H1300073). The University of Canterbury 
Human Ethics Committee approved Surtees’ study (HEC 2009/158). 
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In addition, the conditions of confidentiality and anonymity were set out. Participants were 
promised that their identities and the information they provided would be kept confidential. 
They were assured that their real names or other identifying information would not be used 
in the studies or related publications and presentations and that all data would be securely 
stored. 
Because the studies explored sensitive topics, the risks associated with these needed 
to be considered in advance as part of the ethics approval processes. Participants were 
provided with information about appropriate support services in the event that they wanted 
support as a result of their involvement. This did not prove necessary in either study. 
Findings  
Two collaborative co-parenting families inclusive of a lesbian couple and a gay man in the 
early stages of forming their families through donor insemination are introduced in this 
section of the article, using pseudonyms. Attention is drawn to the ways in which the law 
hinders the families’ preferred formation in both the UK and New Zealand context. The 
complex statutory arrangements within which parenting is negotiated means legal 
parenthood is automatically available as a resource for birth mothers and a second family 
member, but not a third. In their collective efforts to safeguard each person’s position, the 
families make use of available legal resources, consciously choosing to engage with the 
law to the extent that they can despite the obstacles it presents. 
 
The Families 
For Betty and Eliza, a British couple, and Polly and Esther, who lived in New Zealand, 
future motherhood was important. Polly quipped their ‘how we met’ story was “the typical 
lesbian cliché”; “by date two, we said we wanted to have a family!” Both couples planned 
to conceive using sperm from known donors and subsequently recruited donors prepared 
to participate in collaborative co-parenting families as involved fathers and third parents to 
their future children. At the time of interviewing, the couples’ plans were progressing 
apace. Insemination attempts were underway for Betty and Eliza, facilitated by Lenny, the 
single gay man they had recruited.4 Meanwhile, Polly and Esther had a pregnancy well 
established in conjunction with Keane, who they met at a social event.5 Like Lenny, Keane 
was a single gay man.  
Collaborative co-parenting families like those formed by these couples and the men 
with whom they teamed up are not common. The scarcity of studies focused on such family 
models suggests they also lack recognition. Power et al. (2010) longitudinal study, which 
investigated family life for same-sex parents in New Zealand and Australia, concluded that 
contributing factors for this may be dominant social, cultural and institutional traditions 
that assume a child will have two (and only two) parents and a possible reluctance to engage 
with the practical, logistical and legal aspects that result when more than two parents are 
contributing to a child’s upbringing. However, these couples, along with the men, were 
 
4 Betty, Eliza and Lenny were interviewed separately.  
5 Polly was five months pregnant when interviewed. She and Esther were interviewed together. Keane was 
not interviewed, because he was unavailable during the period interviews were conducted. 
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willing to navigate the logistical and legal dimensions inherent in these models in a context 
where assumptions that a child will have only two parents continue to prevail.  
Conversant with the legislation governing assisted reproductive procedures and 
parenthood in their respective countries, the adults across the two families were mindful 
that the law would not take as its starting point their family forms, within which 
collaborative co-parenting was considered key. For Betty, “the idea of co-parenting” meant 
“all of us being equal, all of us being equally involved, all of us being a family.” Polly 
thought co-parenting required particular skills: 
I think a lot of it is the ability to manage the complexities and ambiguities 
of different relationships. To step outside the traditional stereotypes: that 
parenting does not necessarily need to imply sexual intimacy, that the 
parenting alliance can look completely different.  
Returning to earlier points, parenthood law is marked by heteronormative assumptions; 
these retain and reiterate particular norms with parturition identifying a child’s mother and 
conception through heterosexual sex the usual means for identification of a second legal 
parent. As such, the law is ill equipped to handle the kinds of relational complexities and 
ambiguities Polly alludes to in her comment. Accordingly, it impedes these families’ 
preferred form by imposing a two-parent model on them—a model that disregards the 
realities of their arrangements. Nevertheless, unlike some of the families across the two 
studies, these families expected to utilise the law to the degree possible in an effort to 
protect the adults’ respective positions within them. 
Both families had concluded that a written agreement outlining their intentions 
would be prudent and had entered such agreements prior to insemination attempts. Betty, 
Eliza and Lenny’s written agreement confirmed that while Betty and Lenny would be the 
biological parents of any child they conceived, Betty and Eliza would be the legal parents 
of that child. They acknowledged the written agreement was very protective of the 
women’s role in terms of taking responsibility for the child and the ability to make 
decisions on his or her behalf. Despite this, Lenny trusted that things would work out for 
them all, although he acknowledged that some flexibility would be necessary. As he put it, 
“we are trying to create a family, really, and [we need] to be a bit flexible about it”. 
Esther described her family’s written agreement as an “insurance policy.” 
Negotiated through their lawyers, it confirmed that the women intended to be the child’s 
legal parents and that Keane would be a third parent to him or her. It also confirmed that 
Keane would contribute to all aspects of his or her upbringing. Resonating with Luce’s 
(2010) notion of contracting kinship, these kinds of written agreements are not enforceable 
in New Zealand, although parties to them can seek formalisation of key aspects through a 
court order, as mentioned earlier.  
Esther felt her position as the intending non-birth mother was not particularly 
secure and this made her anxious. While Eliza did not specifically articulate a similar 
feeling, presumably she may have experienced something comparable. Either way, legal 
parenthood was a significant resource available to both these women and one that Esther, 
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at any rate, hoped would help assuage her nervousness. The mechanism through which this 
would be achieved for them differed, however.  
For Eliza, legal parenthood would automatically flow from her civil partnership 
with Betty (unless a lack of consent was demonstrated), consistent with the provisions in 
UK law already outlined. Lenny would not therefore have the option of being recognised 
as the second legal parent. Esther’s legal parenthood, on the other hand, would not be 
reliant on formalising her couple relationship with Polly—although they had the option to 
enter a civil union following the passage of the Civil Union Act 2004 in New Zealand,6 
this was not something they had to do. Whether or not she should obtain legal parenthood 
in place of Keane was initially a subject of debate: 
Esther: The one bit of drama with— 
Polly: Keane’s lawyer.  
Esther: Was his lawyer decided … that it would be better for the child to 
have Keane on the birth certificate. She wanted to use us as a new legal 
precedent and try and get three of us on the birth certificate. I said to Keane: 
“Is it that important, for you?” He said: “No.” I said: “Well, then, I must be 
honest. It is that important for me to be on it because I don’t have any other 
right to the child and it just makes me very nervous and the second thing is, 
it’s going to cost us a fortune of legal fees to be this precedence [sic].” I 
personally didn’t want to be involved in that. 
Polly: We decided on the balance of things as well, and this is also Keane’s 
position, is that—Keane is the child’s biological father. You can’t take that 
away. 
Esther: You can’t dispute that. 
Polly: No matter whether he has a piece of paper or not, he still has that.  
Esther: Whereas I’ve got nothing. Nothing.  
Polly: That was a sticky conversation. 
Esther: It was hard. The thing was, Keane was okay with it…. He doesn’t 
actually feel that strongly about it…. So he put it out there, but as soon as I 
told him: “Look, I’m not really comfortable about it” he said: “Let’s drop 
it.”  
Esther was relieved this option was dropped. As Polly’s partner, and in line with the 
deeming rules under Part 2 of the Status of Children Amendment Act 2004, she expected 
to name herself as a parent, alongside Polly as the birth mother, when they registered the 
child’s birth. This option would enable her to formalise her social relationship to the child. 
Similar provisions for lesbian couples to secure joint legal parenthood in other countries 
have also been made (see for example Hayman et al., 2013; NeJaime, 2016; Swennen and 
Croce, 2015). 
 
6 Marriage became possible for same-sex couples within the decade, following the passing of the Marriage 
(Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013 in New Zealand.  
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Eliza and Esther’s ability to achieve legal parenthood status can be understood as a 
strategy that will rectify a perceived ‘imbalance’ between their positions as intending non-
birth mothers and those of their partners. Lesbian non-birth mothers can feel uneasy about 
their status (Gabb, 2005); many are acutely aware they are not recognised as genuine 
parents in the public sphere or well supported (Brown and Perlesz, 2008; Hayman et al., 
2013; Wojnar and Katzenmeyer, 2014). Achieving this status will also rectify a perceived 
‘imbalance’ between their positions as intending non-birth mothers who will have no 
biological connection to their children and Keane and Lenny’s status as people who will 
have this connection. This is not insignificant in the face of assumptions that the men could 
be considered to be more important than them on the basis of biology (Nordqvist and Smart, 
2014). 
In any event, neither Keane nor Lenny will be a legal parent to their children. The 
deeming rules of the Status of Children Amendment Act 2004, Part 2 will prevent Keane 
from becoming a legal parent (there are some exceptions to this rule, but they do not apply 
in his case),7 unless he can persuade Polly and Esther to allow him to be named a parent 
on the birth certificate in place of Esther. This was not a satisfactory option from Esther’s 
perspective. Likewise, Lenny will not be considered a parent for any purpose Under Part 2 
of the HFEA 2008 by virtue of the fact that Eliza will automatically be recognised as the 
second legal parent.  
Polly and Esther expected to provide day-to-day care of the child in their home 
following his or her birth, as well as being his or her legal parents and guardians. Keane 
was to enact non-residential fathering/parenting in ways prescribed through their written 
agreement. This was to be strengthened through his appointment as an additional 
guardian—a step intended to reinforce his position as a third parent by securing his legal 
authority over decision-making and day-to-day care of their child. Similarly, Betty, Eliza 
and Lenny expected Lenny would seek to obtain parental responsibility for their child. 
They also intended to have him named on a shared residence order.8 This was reassuring 
for him. As he said, “that was kind of the compromise that if I’m not going to be the legal 
parent, I am taking that court order which sort of gives me that parental status.” 
There was a strong sense from the interviews that each of the six adults within these 
two families understood their arrangements as an attempt to create a family that included 
all of them. For example, Betty pointed out Lenny “is very much part of our family now.” 
And, in a similar vein Polly said, “we’re very clear that we will be mums and dad.” Despite 
this, legal recognition played an interesting role in their respective family dynamics. 
Although each of the adults professed the ideal of creating a family, for the women this 
was very much predicated on the idea of firm pre-conception intentions. Lenny alone 
expressed a willingness to take things on faith and see how things developed, trusting that 
they would be able to navigate the future together in a mutually acceptable way. This 
 
7 Exceptions include if the mother was single at the time of conception and later embarks on an intimate 
relationship with or marries the donor or if the donor successfully gains adoption of the child (which would 
then extinguish the rights of the other parent/s). These exceptions provide further evidence of the 
significant obstacles the law can present to families like theirs.  
8 This would now be a child arrangements order. 
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tension between prior family planning and organic development as a family indicates the 
different ways these families can form and the different expectations that can exist. 
Although the level of agreement that existed between the adults in both families 
was very high, it is possible that their intentions could change, particularly when 
considering that Betty, Eliza and Lenny were yet to conceive a child and Polly, Esther and 
Keane’s child was yet to be born. A number of studies draw attention to disparities between 
the expectations of lesbian couples and gay donors in relation to donor-child relationships 
and roles, despite agreements between all parties on this matter prior to the conception and 
birth of children (see for example Dempsey, 2004; Dempsey, 2005; Dempsey, 2012; Riggs, 
2008a; Riggs, 2008b; Scholz and Riggs, 2013).9 Lenny and Keane will be in the more 
vulnerable position if intentions change or disparities in expectations were to arise, because 
only the women will be the legal parents of their children and only they will appear on the 
birth certificates. Without legal parenthood or parental responsibility or guardianship, the 
men will have no rights, responsibilities or liabilities in respect of their children and the 
children will lose those that would otherwise stem from them. The interests of heterosexual 
couples utilising donated gametes predominantly shape the protection of the donor from 
rights, responsibilities or liabilities. This is particularly significant for Lenny and Keane 
because their loss of rights, responsibilities or liabilities will be the case irrespective of 
their families’ plans to be jointly acknowledged as parents. As Polly said, “[t]he law 
doesn’t protect the third parent—whoever is decided is the third parent.”  
In Dempsey’s (2010) study, a non-cohabiting single lesbian and a single gay man 
who decide to have a child together typify the kinds of collaborative co-parenting 
arrangements possible in friendship contexts. According to Dempsey (2010: 1154), in such 
arrangements “the conventional assumption is that biological motherhood and fatherhood 
are grounds for parental rights and responsibilities.” Although Betty, Eliza and Lenny, and 
Polly, Esther and Keane view themselves as setting up collaborative co-parenting 
arrangements, this is not done on the basis of a co-parenting agreement like the one 
Dempsey (2010) describes. The written agreements these families have protect the legal 
rights and responsibilities of the female couples while leaving the biological fathers legally 
vulnerable. While the intention is to remedy this to the extent possible following the birth 
of their children through additional guardianship for Keane and court orders for parental 
responsibility and shared residence for Lenny, the power very much remains in the hands 
of the female couples; the men are largely reliant on the willingness of the women to honour 
pre-conception plans. Despite the skewed nature of their written agreements in terms of 
legal rights and responsibilities, which makes them seem more like Dempsey’s (2010) 
social solidarity agreements, the actual parenting envisaged in them appears to fit more 
with an understanding of collaborative co-parenting. As their stories highlight, the current 
legal context in New Zealand and the UK is complex in its recognition of the partners of 
birth mothers in same-sex relationships as legal parents while persisting with the 
assumption that there can only be two legal parents. Despite the progressive nature of the 
law in both jurisdictions with respect to relationship and parenting recognition, rules 
determining parental status clearly fall short in these (and other) kinds of lesbian and gay 
 
9 While these families were not in dispute about expected roles, comparisons can be made with the 
reported experiences of disputing families from the case law. 
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collaborative co-parenting models of family. Potentially the rules will also fall short for the 
increasing number of heterosexuals who are turning to such models (for more on this see 
Jadva et al., 2015; Ravelingien et al., 2016).  
Concluding discussion 
Following Hare and Skinner (2008), an existing adult bias in law that a child should not 
have more than two legal parents is a significant obstacle for the collaborative co-parenting 
arrangements of the two families introduced in this article, despite the efforts made to 
ameliorate their respective situations to the extent the law enables. This bias serves to 
dismiss what will become their children’s reality following birth; the children will have 
three parents but will be denied a legally recognised parental relationship with their fathers, 
who expect to parent alongside the mothers, as per the agreed conditions of sperm donation. 
Situations such as this highlight the need for legislative change if the reality of these kinds 
of arrangements for parents and children are to be formally supported.  
The findings of the studies suggest that there are benefits to collaborative co-
parenting models of family for parents and children (see also Herbrand, 2017). In New 
Zealand and the UK, the kinds of complex situations emerging from such models could be 
resolved if legal provisions were made for more than two parents to be identified in law 
subject to the wishes of the parties concerned. Similar recommendations have been made 
elsewhere but to date have not been adopted widely (see for example Dietz and Wallbank, 
2015; Gunn and Surtees, 2009; Law Commission, 2005; Polikoff, 1990; Ryan-Flood, 2009; 
Swennen and Croce, 2015). Importantly, such legal provisions would readdress the 
problems parents without legal status can face, as well as disadvantages to children, 
including the loss of rights that would otherwise flow from these parents, such as 
citizenship and inheritance. Significantly, access to these parents could not be denied to 
children as can sometimes occur when conflict between parents with and without this status 
occurs, despite previously agreed plans for the ongoing active involvement of all parents. 
Currently, the situation in both jurisdictions remains unsettled and unsatisfactory. 
Historically, ‘family’ has been a problematic notion for gay and lesbian individuals, 
particularly in relation to raising children. Since the gay and lesbian rights movement in 
the 1970s and 1980s, gay men and lesbians have had to position themselves in relation to 
a heterosexually dominated conception of the family and raising children, from which they 
had largely been excluded. As Kelly (2007) suggests, law has a significant contribution to 
make within marginalised communities both for its ability to confer concrete rights on the 
members of these communities, but also because of the symbolic power afforded through 
this process. Therefore, it is understandable that ‘the power of law’ takes on a special 
significance for same-sex parents.  
However, it is important to recognise that law reform is not necessarily a complete 
solution. Nor does it always lead to the desired social change. For example, Kelly (2011) 
aptly observes that broad social transformation does not necessarily follow from legal 
acknowledgement of lesbian motherhood. Her observation could equally apply to 
collaborative co-parenting: the fact that the legal system might in the future recognise 
collaborative co-parenting does not mean this will lead to greater social recognition of these 
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parenting arrangements. Nevertheless, legal advocacy and activism can be a key motivator 
for social change. As Brickey and Comack (1987) point out, law is a significant avenue for 
generating such change. Certainly, law can play an important, although not necessarily 
determinative role, in deciding who qualifies as a parent.  
In recognising law’s role in this regard, and as a reaction to historic exclusion, 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, queer and other (LGBTQ+) activists have long argued for 
legal recognition on the basis of equality between same-sex and different-sex families. 
Considerable progress has been made towards achieving at least formal legal equality in 
New Zealand and the UK. However, equal treatment in the statute books does not always 
result in a practical outcome that is consistent with substantive equality. Furthermore, those 
seeking formal legal equality may see this as the sole desired outcome without challenging 
the institution, in this case legal parenthood, in which they wish to be included. As Leckey 
(2015: 1) comments:  
Groups seeking equality sometimes take a legal victory as the end of the 
line. Once judgment is granted, or a law is passed, coalitions disband, and 
life goes on in a new state of equality. For their part, policymakers may 
assume a troublesome file is now closed.  
Despite this, early contributions to the same-sex marriage debate demonstrated different 
approaches within the gay and lesbian communities in terms of advocacy and resistance.  
Alongside mainstream voices arguing for same-sex marriage on the basis of equality, other 
more radical voices came to the fore. For example, Polikoff (2000) argued that an equal 
rights politics focused on the right of lesbians and gay men to marry on the same terms as 
those available to heterosexuals, in combination with invoking their right to marry as a 
‘choice’, falls short of visualising a much more transformative model of family relevant to 
everyone (for other radical commentators see Boyd and Young, 2003; Butler, 2002). This 
idea of the potential of gay and lesbian relationships to transform the marriage model has 
been built on both in relation to same-sex and different-sex marriage, to argue for greater 
recognition of a diverse range of adult relationships.    
Some scholars, although still relatively few, have also echoed these arguments in 
relation to same-sex parenting. In particular, Kelly (2011: 5) claims:  
While an equivalency approach, typically grounded in formal equality, may 
be adopted because of the strategic advantages it presents in the courtroom, 
the risk is that it will underplay the differences between lesbian and 
heterosexual parenting relationships and thus limit reform to that which can 
be understood within the existing normative framework.  
These concerns are engaged by the reforms instituted by the Status of Children Amendment 
Act 2004 in New Zealand and the HFEA 2008 in the UK. It is commendable that female 
parents can be automatically recognised as a child’s legal parents from birth in these 
jurisdictions. However, it is not necessarily the case that in each of the families across the 
two studies the intention is for the biological father to be a legal stranger to his child. This 
is premised on a heteronormative approach to parenthood, to which some same-sex couples 
do conform. However, in taking this as the basis for including same-sex parents rather than 
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asking whether the existing approach is suitable for their needs, the law limits the 
possibilities for recognising the range of same-sex families.  
As an alternative to a legal model of parenthood premised on formal equality and 
the inclusion of same-sex parents within a heteronormative conception of legal parenthood, 
McClain (2013), writing in the US context, advocates a ‘diversity model’ of parenthood. 
As she explains, this model recognises and values diversity; it can encompass a range of 
possible pathways to parenthood and locates varying parenthood positions on a continuum. 
Moreover, it fits with family law developments that safeguard particular pathways and 
positions. Kelly’s (2011: 46) earlier substantive equality approach, which “is much more 
likely to produce laws that cater to families of difference, whether they include three 
parents, non-conjugal co-parents or involved known donors”, is not dissimilar.  
This article began by demonstrating how prescriptive New Zealand and UK law is 
in terms of which parent-child relationships are legally recognised. However, the studies 
that this article discusses illustrate that lesbians and gay men seek to form families that do 
not conform to traditional notions of the family that continue to be reflected in the law. The 
findings of these studies show that the gay men and lesbians engaged in collaborative co-
parenting understand themselves to be creating families that reflect the interests and honour 
the intentions of those involved. Lamentably this is not something the law in these 
jurisdictions currently encourages or facilitates.  
As mentioned, other jurisdictions have acknowledged the need to recognise 
multiple parents in the context of collaborative co-parenting. Given this, it is not clear that 
there is any justification for a lack of legal recognition. What is more, this lack of legal 
recognition creates difficulties for collaborative co-parenting families and a sense of 
disillusionment with law’s relevance to their family. On this basis, we advocate for a more 
flexible and inclusive notion of legal parenthood that can adequately accommodate the 
interests of those involved in gay and lesbian collaborative co-parenting families. Such an 
approach would be beneficial not only for LGBTQ+ parents but also for the increasing 
number of heterosexual individuals who seek to parent outside the paradigm of the conjugal 
couple relationship.         
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